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1. INTRODUCTION. 
The i n d u s t r i a l d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n p o l i c y has been one of the most 
important elements of government pol icy aimed at development in the 
a f r i c a n ' reserves ' over the past three decades. No aspect of the 
development of these areas can be understood in i s o l a t i o n from the 
overal l dynamics of the South Afr ican p o l i t i c a l economy. In the case 
of i n d u s t r i a l d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n in the T ranske i , not only are the 
incentive packages determined by the central South Afr ican government, 
which d i rec t l y pays half of a l l claims, but the f ina l arb i ter on the 
a c c e p t a b i l i t y or o therwise of p r o j e c t s is the Trade and I n d u s t r i e s 
Hoard in P r e t o r i a . A c c o r d i n g l y , i t is necessary to pay f a r more 
a t t e n t i o n to the o v e r a l l development of the p o l i c y in South A f r i c a , 
than is the case with other sectors of the Transkei 'economy'. 
A f t e r o u t l i n i n g the under ly ing t h e o r e t i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n fo r the 
pol icy and i t s apparent empirical relevance, this paper examines the 
degree to wh ich i n d u s t r i a l d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n in Transkei has 
contributed to economic growth and the el iminat ion of poverty. 
2. INDUSTRIAL DECENTRALISATION IN SOUTH AFRICA. 
This section consists of four sub-sections, which respectively out l ine 
the growth pole model that underpins the industr ia l decentral isation 
po l icy ; examine the relevance of the model to South Af r ica ; describe 
the evolution of the pol icy ; and evaluate the pol icy 's performance to 
date. 
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2.1. The Growth Pole Model 
Growth Pole theory, which provides the theoretical underpinning of the 
industr ia l decentral isation po l icy , contains both an interpretat ion of 
the spatial growth path, an ideal model of spatial development and a 
set of p o l i c y recommendations. The most important of these are (c f 
LJewar et a_l_, 1984; F a i r , 1982) : 
i ) Al though the i n i t i a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of economic a c t i v i t y accross 
space i s determined by var ious l o c a t i o n a l avdantages such as 
proximity to raw materials, markets and transport infrastructure, 
once development reaches a c e r t a i n stage, i t tends to become 
s e l f - r e i n f o r c i n g th rough the o p e r a t i o n of agglomerat ion 
economies. Development i s accord ing l y s p a t i a l l y p o l a r i sed. 
Economic regions outs ide those having reached the threshold of 
self-augmenting development, not only f a l l behind re la t i ve l y due 
to the operat ion of the agglomerat ion economies in the r a p i d l y 
developing areas, but may a lso s u f f e r from a net t r a n s f e r of 
development resources to the growing areas, increasing the degree 
of spatial polarisation. 
i i ) The tendencies towards s p a t i a l p o l a r i s a t i o n r e s u l t in c e r t a i n 
areas possessing an autonomous development capacity (cores) while 
others lag behind (pe r ipher ies ) . The space economy i s thus 
characterised by a core-periphery structure. 
i i i ) At a certain point, tendencies towards spatial polar isat ion w i l l 
be replaced by those promoting spatial integrat ion and equal i ty , 
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due to the combined ef fect of two mutually reinforcing trends. On 
the one hand, as the cores pass c e r t a i n threshold l e v e l s of 
concent ra t ion , agglomerat ion advantages are outweighed by 
concent rat ion diseconomies or congest ion. On the other hand, 
peripheral regions gradually approach the threshold of autonomous 
development through the d i f f u s i o n of innovat ions and other 
benefits. 
i v ) Towns have a par t i cu la r l y important role to play in the process 
of spatial di f fusion. I t is postulated that urban areas serve as 
v i t a l l inkages in the development process as they incorporate 
services required for development in the surrounding hinterland. 
The greater the degree of regional development, the greater the 
requi red l e v e l of development in the reg iona l town. Towns, and 
hence development p o t e n t i a l , can be arranged according to an 
i n t e r l i n k e d set t !ement h ierarchy depending on the range of 
serv ices and products a v a i l a b l e . The absence of set t lements at 
d i f fe rent levels of the hierarchy w i l l resul t in the fa i lu re of 
the d i f fus ion process and mi l i ta te against spatial re - in tegrat ion 
and equal i ty , and prolong spatial polar isat ion. 
v) A c r u c i a l r o l e i s a t t r i b u t e d to manufacturing as the leading 
economic sector. 
v i ) An ' ideal* path of s p a t i a l development can be thus def ined. In 
the i n i t i a l stages the dominant f e a t u r e w i l l be s p a t i a l 
p o l a r i s a t i o n w i t h development concentrat ing in core areas. 
3 
However, at a certain point, d i f fus ion and overconcentration w i l l 
combine to increase the re la t i ve attractiveness of the peripheral 
regions as investment areas, and s p a t i a l p o l a r i s a t i o n w i l l be 
replaced by trends towards equalisation. 
v i i ) Within this broad framework, i t is possible to define a role for 
a state- led spatial pol icy where polar isat ion might be maintained 
past a soc ia l l y and economically optimum point due to market and 
structural fa i lures. As agglomeration economies and concentration 
diseconomies are external benefits and costs to f i rms, the state 
can encourage a more appropr ia te eva lua t ion of l o c a t i o n a l 
advantages through al igning social costs and benefits to pr ivate 
ones through taking core enterprises and providing incentives for 
per iphera l l oca t ion . S i m i l a r l y , where the d i f fus ion process is 
d is rupted by the absence of key elements of the set t lement 
hierarchy, the state can aid in thei r formation through providing 
social and economic infrastructure. 
v i i i ) T h e success of a s tate d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n p o l i c y can thus be 
postulated as a function of three factors : 
a) the e v o l u t i o n of economies of u rban isat ion , such as backup 
f i n a n c i a l and r e p a i r se rv i ces , t r a n s p o r t a t i o n networks, 
communications, social infrastructure and a local market on 
a scale suf f ic ient to enable autonomous growth. 
b) the a t t r a c t i o n of a ' p ropu ls i ve ' i ndus t r y w i t h s u f f i c i e n t 
growth p o t e n t i a l and l inkages to encourage l o c a t i o n of 
re la ted enterprises. 
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c) an appropriate incentive and taxation package. 
2.2. The Apparent Relevance of the itodel for South A f r i ca . 
Examination of the p o l i t i c a l economy of South A f r i c a reveals three 
types of s p a t i a l reg ions ; 'wh i te ' urban areas, of which the major 
metropolitan areas are dominant; 'white' rural areas; and the afr ican 
reserves/homelands/national states. (Hat t rass , 1981). I t i s poss ib le 
to i n t e r p r e t the met ropo l i tan areas as 'cores ' and the homelands as 
the 'periphery'. (Fair , 1982). Examination of the overal l trend in the 
d i s t r i b u t i o n of product ion , as in Table 1, c e r t a i n l y supports the 
hypothesis that the space economy is featured by high l e v e l s of 
concentration and tendencies towards polarised development. 
Table 1 : Production and Population Trends in the Homeland Periphery. 
YEAR HatLMDS G.D.P. SOUTH AFRICA G.D.P. IURANDS I % RSA 
G.D.P. POPULATION PER CAPITA G.D.P POPULATION PER CAPITA GDP POP PER CAP 
(Rm) (000) (R) (Rm) (000) (R) G.D.P. 
1936 49 3 057 16 767 9 590 80 6,4 31,9 20,0 
1946 80 3 252 24 1 637 11 418 143 4,9 28,5 16,8 
1950 94 3 302 28 2 549 12 410 205 3,7 26,6 13,8 
1954 94 3 605 26 3 624 13 739 264 2,6 26,2 9,9 
1959 123 4 023 30 4 m 15 602 301 2,6 25,8 10,1 
1964 147 5 088 29 6 872 18 107 380 2,1 28,1 7,6 
1969 280 6 640 42 10 999 21 131 521 2,5 31,4 8,1 
1974 644 8 406 77 23 116 23 855 969 2,8 35,2 7,9 
1979 1 663 10 562 157 44 179 26 707 1 654 3,8 39,5 9,5 
1980 2 110 11 056 191 58 514 27 317 2 142 3,6 40,5 8,9 
Sources : Hocreland GDP : Knight and Lenta, 1980 : table 2 
: Benso, 1976 : table B.7.1. 
: Benso, 1979 : table 6 
: Benso, 1981 (a) and (b). 
: RSA GDP : SA STATISTICS, 1982, tables 21.4. and 21.5 
: Homeland Pop : Knight and Lenta, 1980 : table 2. 
: Benso, 1976 : table 4.3. 
: Siuicins, 1983 : table 3. 
: RSA pop : Miller, 1983 : table 3. 
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The process of spatial polar isat ion c lear ly worked against the areas 
that p resent l y c o n s t i t u t e the homelands as can be seen by t h e i r 
d e c l i n i n g share of gross domestic product ion. Thus, in 1936 the 
homelands were responsible for generating 6,4% of South Afr ican Gross 
Domestic Product. By 1964, this share had fa l len to 2,1% after which a 
gradual increase to the 1980 leve l of 3,6% occurred. However, due to 
the operat ion of the populat ion i n f l u x and set t lement p o l i c i e s 
f o l l o w e d since 1948, the share of the South A f r i c a n populat ion 
contained in the homelands increased from 25,8% in 1959 to 40,5% in 
1980. A d i r e c t r e s u l t of the cont ras t ing s p a t i a l populat ion and 
product ion t rends, has been the dec l ine in per capi ta output in the 
homelands as a share of the South Afr ican average from 20,0% in 1936 
to 8,9% in 1980. 
The growth pole model contends that manufacturing is the key sector 
that underpins s p a t i a l biases in c a p i t a l accumulation. Th is i s 
seemingly supported by the data in Table 2, which detai ls the spatial 
d is t r ibut ion of manufacturing enterprises between 1916/17 and 1976. 
Table 2 : Shifts in the Spatial Distribution of Manufacturing Enterprises. 
AREA 1916/7 1933/4 1945/6 1956/7 1965/6 1976 
TOTAL HU'ffiR 5 305 8 530 11 351 12 168 12 727 15 461 
% TOTAL 
W. CAPE 16,1 15,7 13,3 12,9 16,0 14,8 
P.E. 3,4 2,7 2,9 4,2 3,6 5,4 
DBII/PTN 6,9 7,4 8,2 9,7 10,7 11,4 
PWV 18,9 29,1 31,2 42,4 43,7 45,1 
WIN l-ET. 45,3 54,9 55,6 69,2 74,0 76,7 
REST OF SA 54,7 45,1 44,4 30,8 26,0 23,3 
SOURCE : Pretorius et al, 1986 : Table 1. 
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With the except ion of the Western Cape, a l l met ropo l i tan areas 
increased t h e i r share of the manufacturing e n t e r p r i s e s , during the 
per iod covered by Table 2. As a whole, the number of manufacturing 
en te rp r i ses in major met ropo l i tan areas increased from 2 403 to 
11 859, w h i l e those in the r e s t of South A f r i c a bare ly increased at 
a l l , r i s ing from 2 902 in 1916/17 to 3 602 in 1976. 
2.3. The Evolution of the Industr ia l Decentralisation Po l icy . 
The data given above, l u c i d l y i n d i c a t e s p a t i a l p o l a r i s a t i o n of both 
output and the d is t r ibut ion of manufacturing enterprises. However, as 
w i l l be seen in sect ion 2.4, growth pole theory requ i res not only 
p o l a r i s a t i o n , but that such p o l a r i s a t i o n i s becoming economical l y 
i r r a t i o n a l . Host commentators deny t h i s second c la im, arguing that 
d u r i n g the dep loyment of the p o l i c y , economic f a c t o r s were 
subordinated to the p o l i t i c a l imperat ives of wh i te supremacy. 
(Weil ings, 1984). Evidence for the l a t t e r viewpoint is provided by an 
examinat ion of the s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l funct ions and e v o l u t i o n of the 
po l icy . 
According to Wellings and Black (1984 : 13-14), the decentral isation 
p o l i c y served a number of s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l funct ions . F i r s t l y , i t 
'aimed at providing the economic base for the population d is t r ibut ion 
needed to retain e thn ic i t y as the fundamental organising pr inc ip le of 
s o c i e t y ' . ( Z i l l e , 1984). Secondly, through d e c e n t r a l i s i n g growth to 
areas where there was no formal minimum wage or trades union 
organisation, i t served to undermine urban forces of popular protest 
and labour o rgan isat ion . T h i r d l y , i t sought to prov ide an economic 
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base f o r a c o l l a b o r a t i v e a f r i c a n c lass . F i n a l l y , i t was designed to 
gain i n t e r n a l and i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e g i t i m a c y f o r the s e p a r a t e 
development i n i t i a t i v e . ' * 
The p o l i t i c a l cons iderat ions that underpinned the p o l i c y are a lso 
evident in i t s or igins and evolution. Thus, while various commissions, 
d a t i n g f rom the 1930's r a i s e d the p o s s i b i l i t y of r u r a l 
i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n , p r i m a r i l y as a means of so l v ing the problems of 
w h i t e pover ty , the major impetus fo r d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n to the 
homelands, derived from the changing dynamics of afr ican settlement 
and mig ra t ion around World War 2. P r e t o r i u s £ t a2 (1986 : 44) po in t 
out : 
"The Nat ional Par ty gained power in 1948 during a t ime of 
rap id i n d u s t r i a l growth and u rban isa t ion , when economic 
i n t e r a c t i o n made i t d i f f i c u l t f o r any South A f r i c a n 
government to j u s t i f y c o n t i n u e d b lack e x c l u s i o n f rom 
p o l i t i c a l expression. Government p o l i c y was now aimed at 
providing the [ p o l i t i c a l and economic] infrastructure to make 
the reserves the basis fo r an e t h n i c a l l y based p o l i c y of 
separate development, u l t i m a t e l y leading to p o l i t i c a l 
independence.." 
In 1955, the repor t of the Tomlinson Commission (UG 61/1955) was 
publ ished. Widely regarded as a b l u e p r i n t f o r the new p o l i c y of 
Separate Development, i t placed considerable emphasis on the 
i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n of areas ins ide and immediately adjacent to the 
homelands as a means of providing employment for the rural population 
that would have to be moved of f the land i f agr icu l tura l development 
was to occur. While i t s recommendations for indust r ia l i sat ion inside 
the homelands were r e j e c t e d on the grounds that i t would requ i re 
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'wh i te ' c a p i t a l and so c o n t r a d i c t the p o l i c y of r a c i a l separat ion, 
'border' indust r ia l i sa t ion was accepted. 
A two pronged s t ra tegy was i n i t i a t e d . On the one hand an i n c e n t i v e 
package was announced to promote decentral isation to 'white' towns on 
homeland borders, enabling africans to l i v e in the homelands and work 
as border commuters. On the other, a Bantu Investment Corporation was 
set up in 1959 to promote homeland development - a l though i t s 
operations were largely concerned with the transfer of ex ist ing white 
owned commercial enterprises to a f r i cans .^ 
However, in the e a r l y stages, the p o l i c y was not successful and 
despite increases in incentives in 1964, the relocat ion of industry to 
border areas was minimal, suggesting that either the incentive package 
was poorly designed, and/or that agglomeration advantages in the major 
metropolitan areas far outweighed concent ra t ion disadvantages. Th is 
led to a f u r t h e r e v o l u t i o n of the p o l i c y . Under sect ion 3 of the 
Phys ica l Planning Ac t of 1967, d i r e c t c o n t r o l s on the expansion of 
a f r i c a n employment in key met ropo l i tan areas were implemented to 
enforce the d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of ( a f r i c a n ) labour i n t e n s i v e f i rms . 
Secondly, and converse l y , under the Promotion of the Economic 
Development of the Homelands Act in 1968, white industr ia l capital was 
a l lowed i n t o the reserves f o r the f i r s t t ime on an agency basis . 
(Dewar, D e t al_, 1984 : 3 - 7). 
In 1971 and 1975 incentives were again increased. Yet, by 1982 despite 
the select ive removal of job reservation and minimum wage leg i s la t i on 
in the development p o i n t s , an e f f e c t i v e r e l o c a t i o n of i n d u s t r i a l 
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development had s t i l l not been achieved, and the Manual on the 
Promotion of Industr ia l Development as an Element of a Co-ordinated 
Regional Development Strategy for Southern A f r ica published in 1982, 
began with the statement that : 
"Ef forts to achieve a more equal d is t r ibut ion of secondary 
indust r y have not met w i t h p a r t i c u l a r success, and i t has 
become c lear that a new approach to promote development in 
the less developed areas is required". 
Var ious reasons have been advanced f o r the apparent f a i l u r e of the 
d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n p o l i c y . (Dewar e t a_l_, 1984; W e l l i n g s , 1984; and 
Black, 1985). F i r s t l y , ra ther than d e c e n t r a l i s i n g to border areas, 
metropolitan firms responded by substitut ing capital for labour, non-
afr ican for african labour, relocating to urban areas such as Durban-
Pinetown where the r e g u l a t i o n s were i n o p e r a t i v e , and, in the f i n a l 
instance, closed down.'-* One est imate , based on app l i ca t i ons f o r 
exemptions from the p rov i s ions of the Ac t , was that f o r every job 
created in a development po in t between 1968 and 1973 near ly ten 
met ropo l i tan jobs were destroyed, l i t t l e wonder that Black (1985 : 
189) claims : 
"Whi le i t is impossib le to measure, w i t h any degree of 
precision, the number of jobs foregone in areas not supported 
by i n c e n t i v e s , a l l i n d i c a t i o n s are that such employment 
losses are substantial. . . In this respect the most disasterous 
s i n g l e p o l i c y has, w i thout a doubt, been the Phys ica l 
Planning A c t . " 
S e c o n d l y , due to p o l i t i c a l p r e s s u r e , not o n l y were too many 
development points ident i f ied , but were often located in areas that 
o f fe red very l i t t l e prospect f o r the e v o l u t i o n of agglomerat ion 
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economies. Th i rd l y , and re latedly , the incentive package was unable to 
compensate for the advantages of urban location. 
In 1982, a new pol icy was announced. I t s major features were, f i r s t l y , 
a s h i f t in the basis of a l locat ing growth points away from homelands 
to e i gh t i d e n t i f i e d 'development reg ions ' which were a l l o c a t e d 
d i f f e r e n t w e i g h t i n g s a c c o r d i n g to t h e i r p e r c e i v e d need f o r 
development. Secondly, the number of growth points at which incentives 
were to be paid was to be c u r t a i l e d . T h i r d l y , d i r e c t con t ro l s on 
met ropo l i tan expansion were to be replaced w i t h i n d i r e c t f i s c a l 
measures. In addition, the incentive pol icy was revised, the level of 
incent i ves increased, and the share of d i r e c t cash payments (as 
opposed to t a x a t i o n r e l i e f ) was ra ised. F i n a l l y , growth po ints were 
divided into four sub-types : 
a) Oeconcentrat ion po in ts are 'adjacent or c lose to met ropo l i tan 
areas towards which i n d u s t r i a l growth could be channel led to 
lessen the pressure of overconcent rat ion i n the met ropo l i tan 
areas' . (Manual, 1982 : 4) 
b) I n d u s t r i a l Development Po ints are 'po in ts where a l t e r n a t i v e 
agglomerat ion advantages can be created to counterbalance the 
ex ist ing metropoles and thus create employment opportunities in 
the regions concerned', ( ib id , 7) 
c) O t h e r i n d u s t r i a l p o i n t s are 'po in ts where concessions have 
p rev ious l y been granted, but which are not Oeconcentrat ion 
Po in ts , I n d u s t r i a l Development Points or ad hoc cases', ( i b i d , 
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12) 
d) Ad Hoc cases are 'those cases where the specif ic project and not 
the area is the deciding factor for the granting of incentives in 
one form or another ' , ( i b i d , 13). 
The d is t r ibut ion of these d i f fe rent growth points in 1984, is detailed 
in Table 3. 
Table 3 : Declared Growth Points in 1984 
Type/Location 'white' 
RSA 
Self Governing 
National States 
Independent 
National States 
Total 
I . D . P . ' s 24 10 10 44 
Deconcentration 7 3 2 12 
Other Dev Point 48 10 - 58 
Ad Hoc Cases 71 - - 71 
Total 150 23 12 185 
Source : Black, 1985 : table 5.1 
I t is interesting that only 35 of the 185 growth points ident i f ied in 
table 3 are located outside of 'white' South Afr ica. Furthermore, 119 
of the 150 growth po ints in the l a t t e r area are ne i ther IDPs nor 
Ueconcentration Points. Both of these factors indicate the p o l i t i c a l 
pressures to which the D e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n p o l i c y , as a means of 
red ist r ibut ing manufacturing to the homelands, has been subject. 
2.4. A C r i t i c a l Evaluation of Decentral isation Po l icy . 
A c r i t i c a l assumption of growth pole theory is that peripheral regions 
w i l l inherently approach sel f -sustaining development and only a small 
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incentive nudge is required to push them over the threshold. I f this 
i s so, then one would expect an i n c r e a s i n g l y p o s i t i v e assessment of 
the p o t e n t i a l s f o r d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n and a d im in i sh ing r o l e to be 
played by incentives in locational decision-making. However, a number 
of studies, reviewed in this section, question the v a l i d i t y of such an 
assumption at the present stage of development of the South A f r i c a n 
p o l i t i c a l and spatial economy. 
We l l i ngs (1984) conducted a survey amongst met ropo l i tan f i rms in 
Bloemfontein, Durban and East London which are r e l a t i v e l y close to the 
respec t i ve per iphera l regions of Lesotho, Kwa Zulu and Transkei . He 
found that metropolitan firms viewed the peripheral areas as subject 
to i n c r e a s i n g l o c a l p u r c h a s i n g power , p r i m a r i l y due to the 
d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of s t a t e f u n c t i o n s to the ' n a t i o n a l s t a t e ' 
governments, and r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e compet i t ion . Despite these 
seemingly favourable factors, the markets were regarded as r e l a t i v e l y 
small and their growth prospects uncertain. Accordingly, he concluded 
(1984 : 38) tha t : 
" i t does not appear that l o c a t i o n of c a p i t a l in the form of 
of f ices and commercial outlets is as yet considered central 
to market s t ra tegy . Moreover, i t is qu i te c lea r that the 
establishment of factor ies in these regions is not influenced 
s ign i f i cant l y by evaluations of thei r potential as markets or 
suppliers of raw mater ia ls . " 
The per iphery i s a lso f e l t to be u n a t t r a c t i v e f o r d i r e c t i n d u s t r i a l 
investment. Black (1985) surveyed a sample of i n d u s t r i a l i s t s in the 
major metropolitan areas. He asked them i f they were considering any 
new investment, the type of area where such investment was planned, 
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and the perceived advantages of these areas. Of the total sample, only 
36% were considering such investment over the next 5- years (i.e. 1984 
- 1989). Of these, 40% (14% of the t o t a l sample) were cons ider ing 
other urban areas; 20% (7,1%) a deconcentration point; 36% (12,4%) an 
industr ia l development point; and 4% (1,4%) some other location. 
The r e l a t i v e importance of the fac to rs encouraging r e l o c a t i o n 
ident i f ied by the metropolitan indus t r ia l i s ts are detailed in Table 4. 
* 
Table 4 : Factors Encouraging Metropolitan Firms to Relocate, 1984. 
Reason/ Location Other Urban Deconcentration Industrial 
Point Developrent 
Point 
Availability of Unskilled Labour 3,0 10,4 24,5 
" Skilled " 10,9 7,7 0,0 
of And 1 lary Services 3,0 2,6 0,0 
Push Factors 3,0 0,0 3,0 
Incentives - 47,8 53,6 
Proximity to Ibrkets 46,8 18,5 8,7 
Transport Costs 4,8 5,2 1,5 
Geographical Suitability 15,8 2,6 8,7 
Others 12,7 5,2 0,0 
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Sanple Size 28 14 26 
Source : Black, 1985 : 182 
* To obtain total reasons, Black weighted 'prims' reasons 2 and 'secondary' 
reasons 1. He then divided by the sanple size to get relative irrportance 
indices. I t is felt that i t is easier to ccnprehend the figures by expressing 
each factor as a percentage of the total weighted answers. 
There are a number of sal ient and inst ruct ive points to be made about 
Table 4 : 
i ) By the time of the survey in 1984, the Phys ica l Planning Act 
provisions had already been largely internal ised by metropolitan 
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f i rms as can be seen by t h e i r r e l a t i v e l y small c o n t r i b u t i o n of 
push factors to the evaluation of locational decisions. 
i i ) Three factors - proximity to markets, geographical s u i t a b i l i t y , 
and the a v a i l a b i l i t y of a n c i l l a r y serv ices - are f a i r l y d i r e c t 
indicators of the perceived agglomeration potential of the areas 
considered f o r new investment. While these fac to rs are very 
important (65,6% of weighted reasons g iven) f o r other urban 
locations, they are much less important for deconcentration areas 
(26,3%) and industr ia l development points (17,4%). 
i i i ) Converse ly , i ncent i ves cont r ibu ted more than ha l f of the 
a t t r a c t i o n of the i n d u s t r i a l development p o i n t s , and only 
s l i g h t l y less for the deconcentration points. 
These points seem to indicate a strong prima facie case that neither 
concentration diseconomies in the core, nor approaching agglomeration 
advantages i n the p e r i p h e r y underp in l o c a t i o n a l dec is ions by 
met ropo l i tan investment, and that the present s p a t i a l s t r u c t u r e of 
industry is strongly dependent on continued payment of incentives. '4 
This conclusion i s r e i n f o r c e d when the perceived disadvantages of 
relocation detailed in Table 5, are taken into account. 
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Table 5 : Perceived Disadvantages of Decentralised Locations - By Area of Survey.* 
Prublem Umtata/ 
Butterworth 
Isithebe Ifetropol 
Survey 
Deconcen. 
Points 
Border 
Tonns 
Isolated 
White 
Towns 
Hcmelar 
I.D.P.1 
Labour 16,4 17,5 35,6 4,1 2,8 13,8 6,i 
Skilled/! tana-
gerial Labour 13,4 14,8 23,2 25,5 29,7 12,4 9,1 
Infrastructure/ 
Agglocreration. 13,8 14,0 6,7 34,5 29,7 26,2 31,8 
Distance to 
ihrkets/Suppliers. 13,2 12,0 22,3 22,8 27,0 36,6 30,3 
Relocation Costs. - 12,3 12,3 - - -
Bureaucracy 12,6 10,3 - 0,7 8,1 4,1 0,0 
Political 10,5 8,2 - - - - -
Local ilarket 
Potential 7,9 8,6 - - - - -
Others 12,2 14,6 - 12,4 2,7 6,9 22,7 
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Sources : Wellings and Black, 1984 : table 8 for coliims 1 - 3 . 
Uewar et al_, 1984 : table 17 for rest. 
*Wellings and Black asked IDP respondents to rank each of the options according to the 
categories 'very important', 'marginally important', and unimportant and gave each 
response accordingly a weight of 3, 2, 1. The metropolitan respondents were given ten 
reasons and asked to rank die top four. These were then weighted accordingly with tfie 
most important factor receiving a weight of 4. Dewar et al_ asked respondents only to 
l is t their three most inportant disadvantages and gave Hie rn weights of 3, 2, 1. Tbeir 
weighted answers were then transformed to give the percentage of the total. 
While the differences in methodologies and weighting systems of the 
surveys used to const ruct Table 5 must be taken in to account, t h e i r 
r e s u l t s are broadly comparable. The f o l l o w i n g po ints of i n t e r e s t 
emerge : 
i ) Poor infrastructure, the absence of agglomeration economies, and 
marketing problems are crucial constraints in the growth points. 
i i ) Problems with the cost and a v a i l a b i l i t y of managerial and sk i l l ed 
labour, an i n d i r e c t i n d i c a t i o n of poor ly developed s o c i a l 
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inf rastructure, are major issues. 
i i i ) In view of the r e l a t i v e l y high value attached to the a v a i l a b i l i t y 
of u n s k i l l e d labour as a perceived advantage of these areas 
(table 4), i t may seem paradoxical that labour problems are given 
a r e l a t i v e l y h igh ranking. The reason f o r t h i s i s that w h i l e 
abundant, there are widespread complaints that the labour i n 
these areas i s of poor q u a l i t y / t r a i n a b i 1 i t y , and su f fe rs from 
high absenteeism and turnover rates . A c c o r d i n g l y , despite the 
f a c t that average u n s k i l l e d wages i n the IDP's are only 35%-55% 
of the metropolitan average, when poor product iv i ty is taken into 
account. In one survey, 23% of f i r m s f e l t that the cost of 
labour was actual ly higher in the IDPs than in the metropolitan 
areas and a f u r t h e r 13% f e l t i t to be the same. (Black, 1985 : 
200). 
I t might be countered that the reason for the poor evaluation of the 
d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n po ints by met ropo l i tan i n d u s t r i a l i s t s l i e s in 
ignorance or poor information rather than poor performance. However, 
the basic conc lus ion that the p o l i c y i s not economical l y sound, i s 
r e i n f o r c e d by an examinat ion of the s t r u c t u r e of i ndus t r y i n the 
growth points. 
Dewar £ t aj_ (1984 : 39) po in t out that s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g growth w i l l 
depend l a r g l e y on the a t t r a c t i o n of a ' p r o p u l s i v e ' i n d u s t r i a l base. 
They describe the growth process in the fo l lowing way : 
"Growth i s generated by the innovat ing capac i ty of the 
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propulsive industry and by i t s backward and forward linkages 
t i n the area] . Innovat ion and growth in the p ropu ls i ve 
industry allow i t to lower the cost of i t s products and this 
stimulates the growth of forward linked industries. Backward 
l inked f i rms, in turn, benefit from increased production in 
response to growth in demand from the expanding propulsive 
i n d u s t r y . Other ' l a t e r a l l y ' induced f i r m s , the output of 
which depends on income generated by the propulsive industry 
and i t s backward and forward linked f i rms, also benef i t " . 
I t i s c lea r that fo r t h i s model to operate, the idea l f i r m should be 
rapidly growing with substantial forward and backward linkages wi th in 
the growth point. 
Examination of firms operating in d i f ferent growth points, revealed 
only one example of a p ropu ls i ve i n d u s t r y , and that has low loca l 
l inkages . Furthermore, a l though 35% of f i rms were c l a s s i f i e d in the 
' r a p i d growth' category , many of these were merely branch p lants 
invo lved in simple l a s t stage assembly operat ions. (Dewar et a l , 
1984). S i m i l a r l y sobering data emerge from the cons iderat ion of 
forward and backward l inkages as can be seen in Tables 5 and 7 on 
sources of inputs and sales. 
Table 6 : Source of IDP Firm Inputs - Backward Linkages. (% Enterprises). 
Source Area/Input Share A l l Most Some L i t t le** Total 
Growth Centre 1,3 6,2 8,8 1,3 17,6 
Local Metropolitan Area 20,0 7,5 22,5 7,5 57,5 
Region 5,0 10,0 6,2 3,8 25,0 
Total 26,3 23,7 37,5 12,6 100,1*** 
Derived from : Dewar et a l , 1984 : Table 10 
* Within a radius of 3iMm. **less than 5%. ***Rounding error . 
According to the data contained in Table 6, only 1,3% of en te rp r i ses 
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derive a l l thei r inputs from wi th in the growth point, and only 17,6% 
obta in at l eas t some of t h e i r inputs there. Even when the radius i s 
expanded to 300km only 26,3% obta in a l l t h e i r inputs ' l o c a l l y 1 . Th is 
ind ica tes that only very low l e v e l s of backward l inkages have been 
achieved, wi th in the region. 
The data contained in Table 7 i n d i c a t e that a s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n 
obtains for forward linkages. 
Table 7 : Destination of Output - Forward Linkages. (% Enterpr ises) . 
Destination/ Output Share A l l Host Some L i t t le** Total 
Growth Centre 
Local Metropolitan Area 
Region 
4,5 
3,4 
8,0 
9,1 
10,2 
13,6 
12,5 
12,5 
12,5 
9,1 
3,4 
1,1 
35,2 
29,5 
35,2 
Total 15,9 32,9 37,5 13,6 99,9*** 
Derived From : Dewar et al_, 1984 : table 11 
*Within a radius of 300km. **Less than 5%. ***Rounding er ror . 
Only 4,5% of enterprises dispose of a l l the i r output w i th in the growth 
po in t and f u l l y 64,7% dispose of none of t h e i r output in the growth 
po in t . In a d d i t i o n to the poor l oca l fo rward and backward l i n k a g e s , 
the r e l a t i v e l y low wages paid in these areas, combined with very high 
levels of consumer leakage, mean that the p o s s i b i l i t y of generating 
' l a te ra l ' linkages is also highly circumscribed and the overal l impact 
of this type of indust r ia l i sa t ion on l i v i n g standards in the area is 
f a i r l y small. Furthermore, these l imi ted benefits have been brought at 
the cost of massive state subsid ies - Rm 600 in 1985/6 - and 
inf rastructura l development, which do not seem j u s t i f i e d . 
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3. INDUSTRIALISATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN TRANSKEI. 
An examination of the spatial history of the South Afr ican p o l i t i c a l 
economy, reveals that the per iphery has been sub jec t to an a c t i v e 
process of underdevelopment. 'Core' i n t e r e s t s have been dominant i n 
contro l l ing the development process in the periphery through biases in 
s tate revenue and expenditure patterns and the conversion of the 
'reserves' into semi-proletarian labour exporting areas. The resul t of 
the combined pol ic ies of population settlement control and distorted, 
or blocked, development has been the character ist ic features of rural 
s tagnat ion and dec l ine and dependence on migrant labour. In t h i s 
contex t , i t is important to e s t a b l i s h the degree to which the 
d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of i n d u s t r y , which has absorbed over Rm 300 i n 
incentives since 1976, has contributed to the general development of 
Transkei , and, in p a r t i c u l a r , the a l l e v i a t i o n of poverty . I n t h i s 
section the possible basis and constraints on indust r ia l i sat ion in the 
T ranske i , as w e l l as the performance of the p o l i c y to date, are 
examined. 
3.1. Bases for Indust r ia l i sat ion in Transkei 
A number of macro-economic factors seem to indicate the v i a b i l i t y of 
i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n in Transkei . High levels of unemployment point to 
ample supplies of cheap labour. Transkei is centra l ly located on two 
key parts of the nat ional roads t ranspor t network. But te rwor th , i t s 
major i n d u s t r i a l development po in t i s l i n k e d by r a i l to East London 
which is only 120km away, f a c i l i t a t i n g export production. Growth in 
consumer expenditure over the last few years has been rapid averaging 
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22,1% per annum between 1979 and 1984. (Transkei Economic Review, 
1986: Table 4). Furthermore, as Table 8 r e v e a l s , on average 81% of 
goods bought by consumers in Transkei are ' imported1 , which, when 
combined with ready access to the South Afr ican market, indicates that 
demand may not be a constraint. 
Table 8 : The Import Component Of Consumer Expenditure By Type, 1984. 
Type of Good Total Expenditure (Rm) % Imported 
Food Products. 693, ,7 74 
Alchohol, Sweets, Soft 
Drinks, Cigarettes 145, ,0 88 
Clothing/Linen 198, ,2 90 
H/Hold Equipment 268, ,7 92 
Stationary, Medicines, 
Recreational Goods 70, ,4 79 
H/Hold Fuel, Transport, 
Vehicles 167, ,9 91 
Agr icu l tura l Inputs 14, ,8 100 
Housing/BuiIding 68, ,4 30 
Total* 1 308, ,1 81 
* Excludes Petrol which amounted to Rm 74 in 1984/5. 
Source : Republic of Transkei, 1986. 
In addition, incentives avai lable to indus t r ia l i s t s at the Industr ia l 
Development Po ints i n T ranske i , d e t a i l e d in Table 9, are among the 
most generous in South Af r ica . 
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Table 9 : Incentives for Industrialisation at Transkei IDPs. 
IDP Transport 7 Year Employment Incentive 10 Year Housing Tender 
Rebate Wage Sil l Max. Per Worker Rental/ Subsidy Price 
(%) (%) (R Per Month) Interest (% Interest Pref. 
Concession Rate) (%) 
(%) 
Butterworth GO 95 110 80 60 10 
Ezibaleni 60 95 110 80 60 10 
Uinta ta 60 95 110 80 60 10 
iltonjeni 50 95 105 70 50 10 
Source : SECOSAF MANUAL, October 1985 : 18. 
For a l l p r a c t i c a l purposes, Transkei has only three IDP's; Umtata, 
But te rwor th and E z i b e l e n i . Incent i ves in a l l three are the same 
c o n s i s t i n g of subsidies of 60% on t ranspor t costs , up to 80% of the 
wage b i l l (or R 110 a worker per month), and al lowances fo r housing, 
c a p i t a l loans and r e n t a l s . In a d d i t i o n , labour costs are also 
s u b s i d i s e d th rough the payment o f t r a i n i n g concess ions and 
i n d u s t r i a l i s t s are able to c la im back 87,5% of t r a i n i n g costs in 
cash.'S Although a 10% price preference is given on tenders, this does 
not seem to work in practice. F ina l l y , a l l indust r ia l i s ts qual i fy for 
relocation allowances and an e l e c t r i c i t y concession. 
N e v e r t h e l e s s , d e s p i t e these b r o a d l y f a v o u r a b l e i n d i c a t i o n s , 
i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n i n Transkei has had r e l a t i v e l y l i m i t e d impact on 
development. 
3.2. Industr ia l Development in Transkei. 
The eva lua t ion of the c o n t r i b u t i o n of i n d u s t r y to T r a n s k e i a n 
development can be viewed in terms of i t s p r o d u c t c o n t r i b u t i o n , 
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measured by i t s growth and share of GOP, and i t s employment and market 
or linkage contributions. 
The growth and changing share of market sector manufacturing to GDP 
are detailed in Table 10. 
Table 10 : The Contribution of IVarket Manufacturing to GDP, 1970-19M. 
Year Value of ilanufacturing Real Value of %GDP Annual Average 
Output at Current Factor Manufacturing Growth from Previous 
Costs (R'000) Output at Factor Period (% p.a.) 
Cost (R'000) Current Real 
1975 = 100 Prices Prices 
1970 2 660 4 169 3,0 - _ 
1975 7 048 7 048 3,4 21,5 11,1 
1980 39 799 22 704 7,0 41,4 26,4 
1981 63 081 31 081 9,1 58,5 36,9 
1982 99 983 43 171 11,8 58,5 38,9 
1983 78 245 30 083 8,4 -21,7 -30,3 
198? 92 232 31 761 7,2 17,9 5,6 
Sources : Abedian, 1984 & 1986 
Between 1970 and 1984, the contr ibution of manufacturing to Transkei's 
GDP increased from Rm 2,7 to Rm 92,2 at cu r rent p r i c e s , and from Rm 
4,2 to Rm 31,8 at constant 1975 prices. As a share of GDP i t increased 
from 3,0% in 1970 to 7,2% in 1984. The growth processes was very 
uneven. Thus, wh i le the average real growth rate was 11,1% between 
1970 and 1975, and 26,4% between 1975 and 1980, i t dec l ined to 8,0% 
between 1980 and 1984. Most of the growth in the l a t t e r per iod 
occurred between 1980 and 1981. Since 1982, when manufacturing 
contributed 11,8% to GDP, the real value of manufacturing output has 
declined, which is par t i cu la r l y disturbing in view of the increased 
incentive package announced in 1982. 
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The contribution of indust r ia l i sa t ion to employment creation, can be 
assessed w i t h the a id of Table 11, which compares the growth i n 
manufacturing employment with the growth of the labour force and wage 
employment in Transkei between 1975 and 1985. 
Table 11 : Enployment By Sector - Selected Years 1975 - 1985. 
Sector 1975 1980 1981 1982 1983 1981 1985 
Labour Foroe 825 526 956 895 986 410 1 017 000 1 047 510 1 078 935 1 111303 
Transkeian Wage Enplqyirent 81 349 179 465 176 458 181 122 185 570 186 108 187 683 
iManufacturing 8 160 23 308 25 240 28 230 29 165 29 796 30 766 
;-bnufacturing Enplqynent as a Percentage of : 
Labour Force 1,0 2,4 2,6 2,8 2,8 2,8 2,8 
Transkeian Wage Enployment 10,0 13,0 14,3 15,6 15,7 16,0 16,4 
Sources : Department of Interior, Labour Reports : Various Years. 
Labour Force from Muller, 1983; Extrapolated at 3% per anrun. 
Between 1975 and 1985, the growth rate of employment in the 
manufacturing sector has been very rapid, averaging 14,2% per annum, 
to ta l l ing an estimated 30 766 persons in 1985. Despite this r e l a t i v e l y 
rapid growth rate, manufacturing employment inside Transkei accounts 
for only 16,4% of local wage employment and 2,8% of the total labour 
supply. The average annual increase in manufacturing employment 
over the per iod of 2 261 workers i s only about 10% of the annual 
increase in the labour supply. Like the output performance, there has 
been a marked decline in the rate of growth in employment. Thus whi le 
the annual average growth ra te was 23,4% between 1975 and 1980, i t 
dec l ined to 5,7% between 1980 and 1985 and only 3,3% from 1984 to 
1985. 
Figures given in Table 11 must be approached with some caution as they 
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are es t imates , and inc lude both non-supported and small industries. 
While the growth in the la t te r two may be part ly at t r ibutable to the 
a c t i v i t i e s of i n d u s t r i e s es tab l i shed under the d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n 
po l icy , a far better indicat ion of the d i rect impact of the pol icy is 
provided by Table 12 which o u t l i n e s employment growth in incentive 
receiving industries at the d i f fe rent growth points on 31 ilarch from 
1982 to 1986. 
Table 12 : Enplqyment at Incentive Receiving Industries by Growth Point, 1982 - 1986. 
Growth Point Labour Category 1982 1984 1985 1986 
Butterworth Wage Labour 5 482 7 270 8 637 11 028 
Salaried Worker - 324 364 628 
Total - 7 594 9 001 11 651 
No. Factories 27 34 37 37 
Umtata Wage Labour 230 430 592 1 449 
Salaried Worker - 25 44 112 
Total - 455 636 1 561 
No. Factories 6 7 12 21 
Ezibeleni Wage Labour - 270 764 1 377 
Salaried Worker - 12 19 38 
Total - 282 783 1 415 
No. Factories - 3 5 9 
Other Wage Labour 958 2 206 2 358 2 390 
Salaried Worker - 81 103 105 
Total - 2 287 2 461 2 495 
No. Factories 5 8 8 9 
Total Wage Labour 6 670 10 176 12 351 16 244 
Salaried Worker - 442 530 878 
Total - 10 618 12 881 17 122 
No. Factories 38 52 62 76 
Source : T.D.C. Records 
According to the f i g u r e s in Table 12, cons iderab le growth in t o t a l 
employment at the d i f fe rent growth points has occurred over the period 
covered by the tab le . Wage employment has more than doubled from 6 
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670 wage workers to 16 214. Considerable expansion has also occurred 
in the number of s a l a r i e d workers from 442 in 1984 to 878 in 1986. 
However, despite this seemingly impressive job creation performance, 
the re la t i ve l y small proportion of new workseekers that this covers, 
must continually be borne in mind. 
Earnings data are of interest both because they indicate the potential 
for attract ing la te ra l l y l inked i n d u s t r i e s , and the c o n t r i b u t i o n to 
household income. Table 13 outl ines earnings by type of labour for the 
d i f fe rent growth points for the year ending on 31 (larch for the period 
1982 to 1986. 
Table 13 : Average Annual Earnings By Type of Labour and Growth Point, 1982 - 1986. 
Growth Point Type of Labour 1982 1984 1985 1986 
ButterwortJi Wage 
Salary 
Total 
Umtata Wage 
Salary 
Total 
Ezibeleni Wage 
Salary 
Total 
Other Wage 
Salary 
Total 
Total Wage 
Salary 
Total 
Source : T.O.C. Records 
There are a number of i n t e r e s t i n g aspects to Table 13. F i r s t l y , in 
1985/6 the average wage paid by the manufacturing sector was R 120,33 
1 217 
1 481 
780 
1 163 
1 437 
13 699 
1 961 
1 755 
12 863 
1 922 
718 
11 109 
1 172 
1 144 
16 865 
1 704 
1 355 
14 033 
1 883 
1 427 
14 726 
1 964 
1 628 
14 016 
2 174 
1 056 
16 686 
1 441 
1 137 
15 797 
1 751 
1 348 
14 815 
1 902 
1 523 
13 130 
2 144 
1 585 
11 918 
2 326 
1 177 
12 646 
1 485 
1 145 
15 954 
1 768 
1 444 
13 292 
2 051 
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per month, while the average salary was R 1 107,67 per month. Not only 
i s the absolute l e v e l of earnings f o r wage labour very low, but the 
l a r g e d i f f e r e n t i a l i n d i c a t e s t h a t the s t r u c t u r e of e a r n i n g s 
contributes considerably to the very unequal income d i s t r i b u t i o n in 
Transkei. 
Secondly, there are considerable v a r i a t i o n s between the d i f f e r e n t 
growth po ints in terms of average payment ra tes , w i t h workers in 
Ezibeleni being the most poorly paid. Th i rd l y , i f one assumes that a l l 
i n d u s t r i e s rece ived R 110 per month per worker in wage i n c e n t i v e s , 
i .e . Ri 320 per worker per annum, then incent i ves covered 62% of the 
wage b i l l in Butterworth, 57% in Umtata, 09% in Ezibeleni , 75% in the 
ad hoc industr ies, and 64% on average. F i n a l l y , although wages paid by 
manufacturing industries receiving incentives amounted to about Rm 35 
in 1985/6, this f igure accounts for about 1% of consumer expenditure 
in Transkei, indicating re la t i ve l y l i t t l e contr ibution to development 
through the local mul t ip l ie r . 
3.3. Constraints on Industr ia l Expansion in Transkei. 
The general process of industr ia l expansion in Transkei has been set 
out in sect ion 3.2. I t was noted that w h i l e there had been a rap id 
increase in the product and employment c o n t r i b u t i o n s of the sector 
from 1975, since 1981 there has been very l i t t l e progress. The 
impression that Transkei is not being viewed in a competitive l i g h t 
over the last few years is seemingly confirmed by data on applications 
and approvals over the per iod March 1982 to March 1986 o u t l i n e d i n 
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fables 14 and 15. 
Table 14 : New and Expanded Project Approvals For Year Ending March 1982 - 1986. 
1982/3 1983/4 1984/5 1985/6 
New Projects 30 28 14 10 
Expansions 4 5 9 14 
Not Coming 14 9 1 -
Failed/Concessions Withdraw 2 2 0 -
Operating 18 19* 12* -
Investment Approved (Rm)** 47,5 58,6 26,9 -
Actual Investment (Rm) 17,0 30,4 10,3 -
Jobs Approved 5 678 5 022 2 645 -
Actual Jobs 2 050 2 283 1 768 -
Investment Pgr Job : 
Approved (R)** 8 367 11 664 10 172 
Actual (R) 8 274 13 319 5 800 
*Excludes pending claims and those st i l l being negotiated. 
**rhe meaning of this figure is not too clear. I t represents more than the actual direct 
investment in plant, machinery, buildings and working capital. Up to one sixth may be 
the projected value of debtors. 
Source : T.U.C Records 
According to the f igures contained in Table 14 on approved projects, 
tne number of new project approvals showed a marked decline from 30 
in the year ending in March 1983 to 10 in 1986. Conversely, the number 
of approved a p p l i c a t i o n s f o r expansions increased from 4 to 14, 
indicat ing perhaps that presently ex ist ing firms are either coming to 
the end of the i r i n i t i a l incentive package terms, or that they wish to 
take advantage of the new incentives. The impact on actual ly operating 
firms was of fset to some degree by the decline in the number of f irms 
f a i l i n g to take up their approved applications. The especial ly large 
gap between new applications and operating firms in 1982/3 probably 
r e f l e c t s increased i n q u i r i e s fo l lowing the marketing campaign af ter 
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the new incent i ves were announced in A p r i l 1982. Neverthe less , the 
dec l ine in actual investment from Rm 17,0 i n 1982/3 to Rm 10,3 i n 
1984/5 is disturbing. One potent ia l l y s i gn i f i cant trend is the decline 
in the actual cost per new job over the per iod , from R 8 274 to R 5 
800 before i n f l a t i o n is taken into account. 
Data on approved and operating projects by area of investor's o r i g in , 
contained in table 15 indicate a declining interest by investors from 
outs ide the Republ ic of South A f r i c a . Thus w h i l e 13 out of 34 
approvals (38,2%) were from the RSA in 1982/3, t h i s f i g u r e had 
increased to 13 out of 24 (54,2%) in 1985/6. 
lable 15 : Source of Approved and Operating Project Applications 1982/3-1985/6. 
Origin 1982/3 1983/4 1984/5 1985/6 
App Op App Op App Op App Op 
R.S.A. 13 10 19 10 15 7 13 -
Other R.S.A. 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 -
Transkei 3 3 6 4 3 0 1 -
S.East Asia 11 2 6 3 4 3 6 -
Europe 4 2 1 1 1 1 4 -
U.S.A. 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 -
Total 34 18 33 19 23 11 24 -
Source : T.D.C. Records. 
Given the r e l a t i v e l y favourable incentives avai lable to indus t r ia l i s t s 
operating in Transkei, this poor performance requires explanation in 
terms of a number of factors : 
i ) Land t e n u r e i s poss ib l y one of the most c r u c i a l issues. In 
Transkei, land cannot be held under f ree-hold by non-cit izens or 
companies. One i n d u s t r i a l i s t in Queendustria noted'8 : 
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"We could have es tab l i shed at E z i b e l e n i , . but at that 
moment we couldn't own the property ourselves. I t could 
never be our own property, so that's why we came here." 
Not only does th i s reduce the s e c u r i t y of investment, but 
precludes i n d u s t r i a l i s t s from invest ing money in buildings and 
housing. In i larch 1985, i t was est imated that T.D.C., which i s 
forced to errect these buildings and then le t them at subsidised 
r e n t a l s , had about Rm 50 t i e d up in i n d u s t r i a l bu i ld ings and Rm 
20 in housing. The oppor tun i t y cost of t h i s c a p i t a l i s enormous 
and the then Corporate Planner claimed that 'This single item is 
the most ser ious s i n g l e c o n s t r a i n t on i n d u s t r i a l development'. 
(Jones, 1985). 
11) P o l i t i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y , both i n t e r n a l l y and r e g i o n a l l y , i s an 
important factor. While Transkei has t rad i t i ona l l y been viewed as 
r e l a t i v e l y s tab le , e s p e c i a l l y when compared to i t s neighbour, 
C i s k e i , th is impression has changed over the l a s t few years . 
Internal disturbances such as on the Universi ty Campus in Umtata, 
the assas inat ions of a deputy cabinet m i n i s t e r and a student 
leader , and r u r a l v io lence are more preva lent . Of more d i r e c t 
concern to i nves to rs , there i s suspic ion of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e 
a r b i t r a r i n e s s . Examples c i t e d are the (suspended) L icenc ing 
Cont ro l B i l l aimed at immediate T ranske ian isa t ion in the 
Commercial Sector , and the d ismissa l of the T.D.C top echelon 
w h i l e a Commission of I n q u i r y was s i t t i n g . Th is uncer ta in t y i s 
c lear l y revealed in an interview conducted with an i n d u s t r i a l i s t 
in Queendustria, who had wanted to s tar t a j o i n t operation with a 
30 
Transkeian in Ezibeleni : 
"We o f fe red a Transkeian 1/3 of the company but he said 
no, he wanted more. He wanted the contro l l ing share. We 
couldn't do that. Somewhere there must be control. While 
we are not Transkeians how could we protect our investment 
there?.. . You can lose i t any day f o r they can t e l l you, I 
want to do i t my way now. Your money would stay. That 
was the danger of the whole thing". 
i i i ) Changes in reg iona l p o l i t i c a l arrangements are also a cause for 
some concern. Examining the rationale behind the declaration of 
at l eas t 2 of f ranske i ' s four I n d u s t r i a l Development Po in ts 
(IDPs), reveals some of the p o l i t i c a l motivations that underpin 
and often negate the decentral isation pol icy . A growth point has 
been declared at Mtonjeni in Eastern Pondoland. This is unl ikely 
ever to material ise as i t is very isolated, has no access roads, 
and i s not even located near an e x i s t i n g town. I t s d e c l a r a t i o n 
was sought p a r t l y to appease a very h o s t i l e area of T ranske i , 
scene of furious rebel l ions in the 1960's, and part ly as a means 
of getting infrastructure into the area, which has l i t t l e chance 
of being obtained i f i t i s not l i nked to 'p roduct i ve ' a c t i v i t y , 
(of f - record conversation with planning o f f i c i a l s in Umtata). The 
Ezibeleni IDP i s even more dubious as i t is located r i g h t on the 
border of Transkei, and less than 3km from the Queendustria IDP 
in South A f r i c a . In th i s contex t , Dewar e t a2 (1984 : 78) make 
the poignant point : 
"A major problem is the underlying p o l i t i c a l motivation of 
d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n p o l i c y . Pressure has been exer ted from 
regional ly based p o l i t i c a l and economic groups to create 
more d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n po ints and t h i s has weakened the 
overal l effectiveness of any one point. Moreover there is 
a tendency to use the system as an attempt to d i f f u s e 
r i s i n g p o l i t i c a l tension i n an area (as i n the case of 
C i s k e i ) . B o t h t h e s e f a c t o r s l e n d a d e g r e e o f 
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u n p r e d i c t a b i l i t y to the e c o n o m i c c l i m a t e i n 
d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n po ints and must i n e v i t a b l y a f f e c t 
confidence and thus their long term performance." 
There are also indications that changes w i th in Region 0, such as 
the p ro l i fe ra t ion of growth points, and especial ly the upgrading 
of East London's status, have worked against Transkei. 
i v ) Poor communications infrastructure is an o f t noted complaint. The 
performance of the postal system is very uneven with let ters sent 
from Butterworth to Umtata often taking weeks to cover 120km, and 
sometimes not a r r i v i n g at a l l . I n E z i b e l e n i , one i n d u s t r i a l i s t 
descr ibed the communications network as 'putr id' and indicated 
the problems that the absence of a telex f a c i l i t y caused for him 
as fol lows : 
"You f i n d that we've got an o f f i c e i n Johannesburg where 
the order gets g iven to our sales agent from a customer. 
They i n t u r n phone them to us. And you know how 
communication i s from one person to the next , i t gets a 
b i t distorted. You end up sending out the wrong thing, or 
wrong co lour , or someone wanted a s l i g h t change. Bang, 
the s t u f f comes back and we have to pay an ex t ra 20% 
cartage cost, or whatever". 
v) The lack of adequate backup se rv i ces i s a lso keenly f e l t as the 
fo l lowing example shows : 
"We've got a compressor here that broke down. I t took us 
a week and a half to get i t repaired. Someone had to come 
down from the Reef to do i t , and when he got here, he 
found he didn't have a l l the spares so he had to come down 
again. So, in the meantime, we had to h i re an outside 
compressor at R90 a day". 
v i ) Despite the abundance of labour and the low wage ra te , many 
indust r ia l i s ts complain about i t s q u a l i t y and high turnover r a t e 
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which increase the cost of t raining and reduce product iv i ty . 
v i i ) Perhaps the single most important long run constraint, however, 
is the increasing f i s ca l burden of the incentive programme. Table 
16 reveals that between 1977/8 and 1984/5 the actual expenditure 
on industr ia l incentives increased dramatical ly from R 498 619 to 
Rm 28,8 and the incentive paid per worker from R 93 to R 2 238. 
Although 50% of this amount comes d i rec t l y from the South Af r ican 
t reasury , the other ha l f must be paid by the Transkei and t h i s 
could be r e a l l o c a t e d to other p r o j e c t s that may have a h igher 
developmental impact.'9 
Table 16 : Incentives Paid to Industry 1976/7 to 1986/7. 
Year Total Paid (R) Incentive Per Worker (R) 
1976/7 8 221 _ 
1977/8 498 619 94 
1978/9 840 759 140 
1979/80 2 209 186 303 
1980/1 3 934 154 443 
1981/2 4 036 285 414 
1982/3 11 756 022 1 020 
1983/4 35 745 058 2 913 
1984/5 28 829 524 2 238 
1985/6* 30 000 000 — 
1986/7 40 000 000 — 
•Budgeted f igures 
Sources : Transkei Auditor General's Reports, Various Years 
Budget Estimates, 1985/6 and 1986/7 
4. CONCLUSION. 
The public costs of the industr ia l decentral isation pol icy in Transkei 
have been massive. Between 1976 and 1985 T.D.C had Rm 191 invested in 
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i ndus t r y as loans and b u i l d i n g s , most of i t y i e l d i n g below market 
rates of return. About Rm 300 has been spent on incentives (including 
the South Afr ican share at h is to r ica l cost). In addition large amounts 
have been spent on i n f r a s t r u c t u r a l development. In re tu rn , Transkei 
has an industr ia l sector that has about 30 000 jobs. Most are very low 
paying and are h i g h l y subsidised. The sector has few loca l l inkages 
and there i s la rge scale leakage of what income has been created. In 
conc lus ion, i t i s perhaps s u f f i c i e n t to quote from a c r i t i c a l 
evaluation of the Butterworth. Industr ia l Development Point (Dewar, et 
a l , 1984b) : 
"An enormous i n d u s t r i a l area has been l a i d out and f u l l y 
serviced in the (somewhat naive) hope of massive short term 
growth occurring : r a i l spurs truncate in the veld; roads are 
g radua l l y being taken over by vegeta t ion : water and waste 
d isposal pipes l i e d e t e r i o r a t i n g under the s o i l surface. 
( p 8 6 ) . . . . [ I t ] has f a i l e d to achieve a cond i t i on of s e l f -
susta in ing growth, and i s u n l i k e l y to do so w i t h i n the 
foreseable fu ture . Fu r ther , i t has had very l i t t l e p o s i t i v e 
impact on i t s immediate h i n t e r l a n d or on the Transkeian 
reg ion as a whole; indeed, i f any th ing , i t s impact has been 
negative in terms of the opportunity costs foregone in other 
potential areas of investment. . . (p.93). 
F i n a l l y , : 
"The issue of reg iona l development cannot be seen in 
i so la t ion from the shortage of development capital available 
and the real d i f f i c u l t i e s fac ing developmental projects in 
per iphera l reg ions. Indeed, the o b j e c t i v e of reg iona l 
planning must be the achievement of maximum developmental 
benefits with avai lable capital , (p.93) 
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NOTES 
1) In d iscuss ing the i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l funct ions of the 
homelands p o l i c y , G i l iomee (1985 : 48), quotes one of the 
c o n d i t i o n s f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l a c c e p t a b i l i t y of Separa te 
Development set down by Hammaskjold in a dicussion with Verwoerd 
as the compi la t ion of 'a p lan f o r r a d i c a l economic development 
p rov id ing f o r i n d u s t r i e s and economic growth w i t h i n the Bantu 
t e r r i to ry 1 . 
2) In 1955 the p o l i c y was expanded to inc lude whi te areas that 
suffered from lagging growth and unemployment. As i t developed 
this dimension of the pol icy has taken on increasing importance. 
3) Black (1985 : 191) found in his metropolitan survey of the South 
Afr ican manufacturing sector that 25% (42% in the PWV) had been 
affected by the Physical Planning Act. The most frequent single 
response (31%) had been the s u b s t i t u t i o n of c a p i t a l f o r labour. 
Only 18% had relocated part of thei r a c t i v i t i e s . 
4) In this context, i t is interest ing to take note of Black's (1985 
: 19 7) f i n d i n g s as to why f i r m s who had c o n s i d e r e d 
decentral isation decided against i t . Again, expressing the number 
of weighted answers for each factor , we f ind 21,2% of the reasons 
cons is ted of d istance from the market, 9,8% d istance from 
suppliers, 6,4% distance from related industr ies, and 7,5% lack 
of infrastructure and services at the proposed relocation area. 
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5) In p r i n c i p l e the dec is ion to a s s i s t in i n d u s t r i a l t r a i n i n g i s 
necessary in a context where much of the labour has no industr ia l 
experience. However, there are a number of problems w i t h 
Transkei 's system that open i t up to sharp business p r a c t i c e s . 
F i r s t l y , in South A f r ica , training concession are paid only for 
courses conducted by registered training schools of f the premises 
of the i n d u s t r i a l i s t s . In T ranske i , i n d u s t r i a l i s t s conduct the 
training themselves. Although each aspect of t r a i n i n g requ i res 
that a course be r e g i s t e r e d and a t r a i n i n g area be set as ide, 
there is l i t t l e stopping an i n d u s t r i a l i s t using workers d i rec t l y 
on the production l ine and claiming training costs. One area that 
is especially contentious is the payment of the i n d u s t r i a l i s t for 
'wastage' that a r i ses from t r a i n i n g . As no o b j e c t i v e standards 
have been set on how much wastage i s 'normal ' f o r t r a i n i n g , the 
system is open to abuse as indus t r ia l i s ts may add their 'normal' 
i n d u s t r i a l wastage and c la im i t as ' t r a i n i n g ' . In a d d i t i o n , the 
system does not d i s c r i m i n a t e between more wastefu l and more 
e f f i c i e n t trainers, imposing these costs on the state. F i n a l l y , 
the cash payment of t r a i n i n g costs , as opposed to t h e i r tax 
d e d u c t i b i l i t y provides l i t t l e i ncen t i ve fo r i n d u s t r i a l i s t s to 
increase ef f ic iency towards p r o f i t a b i l i t y . 
6) Est imates are a lso made of non-marketed 'manufactur ing ' f o r 
Transkei. These largely consist of the value of beer brewing and 
are not taken into account in the discussion. 
7) The most recent urban Household Subsistence estimates available 
are f o r 1983/4. They ranged from an est imate of R 208 to R 296 
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per month. (Transkei P r o f i l e , Number 1 : tab le 5.2). A l l o w i n g an 
average annual i n f l a t i o n rate of 15% per annum would make these R 
275 and R 391 per month r e s p e c t i v e l y f o r 1985/6. The monthly 
average wage paid dur ing t h i s per iod by i n c e n t i v e r e c e i v i n g 
i n d u s t r i e s equal led 44% and 31% of these amounts r e s p e c t i v e l y , 
i n d i c a t i n g the very small c o n t r i b u t i o n made by these wages to 
poverty e l iminat ion in Transkei. 
8) Quotat ions in t h i s sec t ion of the views of I n d u s t r i a l i s t s are 
taken from i n t e r v i e w s conducted by the author in E z i b l e n i and 
Queendustria i n February and March 1986. I t was agreed at the 
time that the ident i ty of the interviewees would not be revealed 
although complete transcripts are held by the author. 
9) The p o s i t i o n i s not helped by the f a c t that most i n d u s t r i a l 
undertakings run at a loss and pay l i t t l e tax. In 1981/2 t o t a l 
company tax p a i d i n T r a n s k e i ( i n c l u d i n g n o n - i n d u s t r i a l 
u n d e r t a k i n g s ) was Rm 0,65 c o m p a r e d w i t h i n d u s t r i a l 
decentral isation incentives of Rm 4,0. (Nattrass, 1983). 
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